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THE DATA-BROKER THREAT:
PROPOSING FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO
PROTECT POST-EXPUNGEMENT PRIVACY
Logan Danielle Wayne*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine if you will the following hypothetical: An eighteen-year-old
who recently graduated from high school is arrested in California for
possession of marijuana. Under California state law, possession of not
more than 28.5 grams of marijuana is classified as an infraction and carries
a maximum punishment of a $100 fine.1 The young man pleads guilty and
timely pays all fines and court fees. Two years later, in accordance with
state law, the court destroys any records pertaining to the young man’s
arrest and conviction.2 However, in the interim a company called
DataBrokerX purchased electronic records from the jurisdiction that was
holding the young man’s file, including records of the young man’s arrest
and guilty plea. Once DataBrokerX purchases the records, it stores the
information in its private database.3 Several years later, the young man
graduates from college and, without having any other run-ins with the law,
applies for his first job. The employer runs a background check through
DataBrokerX and the young man is not selected for the position because the
conviction appears on that consumer report. The employer would never
know that the conviction was vacated because DataBrokerX obtained the
young man’s records before the state granted the expungement.4 Also, the
*

J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2012.
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357 (West 2007 & Supp. 2011).
2
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11361.5 (West 2007) (providing that all convictions
and arrests under § 11357(b) shall not be kept longer than two years after the date of
conviction, or two years after the date of arrest for arrests not resulting in convictions, and
that any court or agency having custody of the records shall destroy the records at that time).
3
See infra Part III for a discussion of the data-broker industry. “Data broker” refers
generally to private background check companies and, as used in this Comment, refers to
those companies that provide information about criminal records obtained from local courts
or other public records sources.
4
The term “expungement,” as used herein, refers to the full range of remedies that allow
for the sealing, purging, or erasure of a criminal conviction.
1
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young man may never find out why he was denied employment because
employers are not required to tell potential employees why they were
denied a job.5 Finally, even if the young man is informed that it was due to
his criminal conviction, this is of little consolation as he has already
suffered by losing the job opportunity. This is precisely the type of injury
that expungements are designed to prevent.6 But, despite the court’s
expungement of this young man’s record to prevent further lost
opportunities, the young man must go through steps to remove the
information from DataBrokerX’s archives.7 Once he has done this, there is
still no guarantee that DataBrokerX is the only company with the
information.
It is a reasonable argument that a young man in this position deserves a
second chance. However, even barring debate about whether or not the
young man deserved to have his conviction expunged, one can recognize
that once the young man has been granted an expungement, he is entitled by
law to the benefits of that expungement. It is a fundamental principle of our
legal system that the law must be upheld. This Comment will argue that,
once an expungement is granted, it is wrong for a non-governmental source
to release information about the conviction, because that action undermines
the purpose of expungement laws.
Expungement is a special form of relief that allows individuals, like
the young man in the hypothetical, to “restore him[self] to his former status
in society”8 by essentially erasing his criminal history and granting him a
clean slate. This allows individuals with expunged records to legally
5

One major problem with the issue proposed herein is that it is difficult, if not
impossible, to determine how often expunged records are released or how often the release
of expunged records results in the loss of housing or an employment opportunity. This is
due, in part, to the fact that employers are not required to disclose why they pass over a
particular person for a job and landlords do not have to disclose why they choose one tenant
over another. As such, there is currently no way of determining precisely how many people
are affected by the wrongful dissemination of expunged records. This Comment is
somewhat limited due to that lack of empirical research to back up its claims; however, the
fact that the structure of the data-broker industry allows for the release of expunged criminal
records combined with reports of individual incidents where expunged records have been
wrongfully released, provide enough of a basis for the arguments contained herein. An
interesting and important supplement to this Comment would be an empirical study
quantifying the effect of the data-broker industry on post-expungement privacy. See infra
Part III for further discussion.
6
See infra Part II.
7
Removing information from a data broker’s archive is often an arduous process that can
even require a person to purchase his or her own records before requesting that the
information be removed. See infra note 80 and accompanying text.
8
People v. Mgebrov, 82 Cal. Rptr. 3d 778, 781 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). Other state courts
have described the purpose for providing expungement in similar terms. See infra Part II.
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refrain from disclosing information about their expunged conviction to
potential employers or landlords.9 When the expungement is granted, an
expungement order is served on a government recordkeeping agency; this
order generally requires the destruction or prohibits the release of any
records pertaining to the expunged arrest or conviction.10 However,
because trials are public and criminal information is also a matter of public
record, it is currently not illegal for non-government sources (e.g., data
brokers) to obtain criminal records.11 Furthermore, expungement orders do
not apply to non-government sources.12 This may be because when
expungement laws were first passed, the government was the only source
for obtaining criminal records,13 or perhaps because legislators did not
predict the growth of the data-broker industry. Either way, data brokers are
currently free to distribute information from expunged records without any
repercussions.
Having identified a pertinent example of how technology has outpaced
regulation, this Comment proposes that a massive and largely unregulated
private data-broker industry poses a significant threat to post-expungement
privacy at potentially great cost to individuals with expunged records.14
Data brokers are not required to update their records, and as a result,
expunged convictions are being released to the public through these private
companies.15
Currently the onus of enforcing postconviction privacy rights is on
individuals with expunged records.16 This Comment will propose that,
because of the digitization of data sharing and the increased prevalence of
the data-broker industry, individual enforcement is ineffective if not
helpless to protect the rights of individuals with expunged records.
Ultimately, this Comment will argue that if such violations of post9

See infra Part II.
See SEARCH, NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE RECORD
INFORMATION 82–83 (2005), available at http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf.
[hereinafter SEARCH REPORT].
11
See infra Part III.
12
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 83.
13
See infra Part III.
14
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Criminal Records Erased by Courts Live to Tell Tales, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 17, 2006, at A1.
15
Id.; see also Rebecca Oyama, Note, Do Not (Re)Enter: The Rise of Criminal
Background Tenant Screening as a Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L.
181, 188–89 (2009).
16
Oyama, supra note 15, at 189; see also SEARCH REPORT, infra note 76 (discussing
the process for removing records from proprietary databases).
10
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expungement privacy continue unregulated, they have the potential to
render the legal remedy of expungement moot in the real world.17
Therefore, because of the potential magnitude of this problem, an ex ante
remedy in the form of federal legislation is the only way to protect postexpungement privacy rights and expungement law itself. As such, this
Comment proposes goals for a federal statutory scheme.18
This Comment will proceed in four major parts. Part II discusses the
underlying purpose for and importance of providing relief through
expungement.19 Of particular importance is that expungement allows
individuals to obtain employment and housing, unhampered by their status
as ex-offenders. Part III proceeds by discussing the evolution of the databroker industry and how criminal records have become readily available
through largely unregulated, private, non-government sources. Part III
argues that the unregulated release of information by data brokers is posing
a serious threat to the important role that expungement plays. Part IV
discusses why a federal regulatory scheme is the best way to protect post-

17

For a discussion on the importance of expungement as a legal remedy, see infra Part

II.
18

A major issue that often arises in the context of expungement is policy concerns about
allowing ex-offenders to conduct themselves in society unidentified as having been
convicted of a crime. James W. Diehm, Federal Expungement: A Concept in Need of a
Definition, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 73, 75–80 (1992). Although such policy concerns do play
a significant part in the overall scope of expungement scholarship and jurisprudence, they
are beyond the scope of this Comment. Because public safety concerns associated with the
nondisclosure of an individual’s criminal record increase with the severity of the crime, this
Comment applies only to those instances where expungement is arguably most
uncontroversial: misdemeanor offenses and arrests that do not result in conviction. The
intention is to ameliorate policy concerns that account for the differences in expungement
laws from state to state. For this reason, juvenile and sex-related expungements are
excluded. Furthermore, even though a small percentage of states have passed laws that
allow expungement of felony convictions, such statutes are excluded from this analysis
because they tend to spark the most heated debate surrounding policy considerations. E.g.,
ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-93-301 to -303 (2006) (permitting expungements for first-time
felony convictions unless the crime involved a sex offense with a victim under the age of
eighteen); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 8506(c) (2007) (providing for expungement of felony
convictions once the person reaches age eighty or reaches age seventy-five with no criminal
activity listed on the person’s record in the preceding forty years); KAN. CRIM. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 21-6614 (West, Westlaw through 2010 Legis. Sess.) (allowing expungement for
certain felony convictions between three and ten years after completion of sentence,
depending on the severity of crime). That being said, the fact that a vast majority of states
allow expungement of certain misdemeanor records is evidence that we as a society have
embraced the idea that some people deserve a fresh start.
19
There is currently no federal expungement statute. For a discussion of the need for a
federal expungement statute, see Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: The Need for
Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1 (2008).
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expungement privacy rights. Finally, this Comment concludes with Part V,
outlining the legislative aims in creating such a statute.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPUNGEMENT AS A LEGAL REMEDY
Offering relief to individuals with expunged records after information
from the expunged records has been released is about as effective as
offering an umbrella after the rain. This is because once a data broker
releases the criminal record, the purpose of expungement is significantly
undermined. Before delving into violations of post-expungement privacy,
this Comment will explore the rights expungement bestows upon a person
and the source of those rights are derived. This Part begins with a brief
history and overview of expungement, then focuses on the importance of
expungement as a form of legal relief and the purpose that it serves in
society, and concludes with a discussion about the right to postexpungement privacy and how the protection of information pertaining to
expunged convictions is vital to the survival of expungement as a legal
remedy.
A. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW

As of 2008, forty-five states and the District of Columbia have some
form of expungement legislation.20 While the remedy has been given many
different names—“sealing,”21 “erasure,”22 “deferred judgment,”23 “setting
aside,”24 “vacated”25—the general aim behind each individual state law is
remarkably similar across jurisdictions. The goal is to eliminate at least
some of the collateral consequences associated with criminal convictions
and to facilitate reintegration into society for certain individuals by
essentially granting them a clean slate.26
Expungement is not granted lightly.27 Especially in the circumstances
20
Mouzon, supra note 19, at 31 (“Most states have addressed the expungement issue
through legislation. Forty-five states, plus the District of Columbia, provide relief for some
ex-offenders from the bondages attached to having a criminal history, either through
expungement or other similar relief.”) (footnotes omitted).
21
See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.62.180 (2006).
22
See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-142a (West 2009 & Supp. 2011).
23
See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 907.3 (West 2003 & Supp. 2011).
24
See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 780.621 (West 2007).
25
See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 9.94A.640, 9.95.240 (West 2009).
26
See infra Part II.B.
27
Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview of Criminal
Expungement Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1335
(2005) (“Expungement is defined at law as an ‘extraordinary form of relief.’ It does not
apply to every individual suffering the detrimental effects of a criminal history . . . . [T]he
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to which this Comment is limited, expungement is granted only to those
who deserve it most.28 In sum, this Comment focuses only on misdemeanor
convictions and reports of arrests that do not result in conviction—those
instances of expungement where it can be assumed that the benefits gained
by granting expungement outweigh any potential harms to society and
public safety.29
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF EXPUNGEMENT

The most basic explanation for expungement is that we, as a society,
recognize that some people deserve a second chance.30 Or, at the very least,
our society has recognized that certain offenders do not deserve ‘criminal’
status once they have paid their debts to society.31 As such, the
fundamental goal of expungement is to provide relief from the stigma
associated with criminal status.32
Our society makes a litany of
remedy is unique and given only to the most deserving individuals.” (footnote omitted)).
28
See infra Part II.B.
29
For support of society’s interest in granting expungement, see Geffen & Letze, supra
note 27, at 1340 (“Expungement relieves society of the burden of supporting certain
individuals with criminal records. As previously explained, an expungement can allow an
individual to obtain employment and eliminate the individual’s reliance on government
benefits.”).
30
See, e.g., State v. N.W., 747 A.2d 819, 823 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (finding
the New Jersey legislature’s purpose in enacting an expungement statute was to “give a onetime offender who has changed his or her life a second chance”); Steven K. O’Hern,
Expungement: Lies That Can Hurt You In and Out of Court, 27 WASHBURN L.J. 574, 574
(“Expungement of a prior criminal conviction is often viewed as an admirable process,
allowing an ex-offender a fresh start.” (footnotes omitted)).
31
Luz A. Carrion, Rethinking Expungement of Juvenile Records in Massachusetts: The
Case of Commonwealth v. Gavin G., 38 NEW ENG. L. REV. 331, 368 (referring to both adult
and juvenile expungement and stating that “[r]ecord expungement serves the crucial societal
function of giving a second chance to the average person who needs a clean record to
advance and succeed in life and who will be most harmed by a record’s existence” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
32
Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on
Collateral Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 157 (1999) (addressing
the effect of collateral consequences and stating that “deprivation of the benefits of
citizenship carries a strong symbolic message stigmatizing convicted felons as less than full
members of society”); Andrew Hacker, Comment, The Use of Expunged Records to Impeach
Credibility in Arizona, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 467, 470 (2010) (“The ‘collateral consequences’ of a
criminal record often carry other, more subtle burdens that are not easily quantified. The
social stigma associated with a criminal past—sometimes referred to as ‘the stigma of
conviction’—often is unaffected even after a rehabilitated offender has had his civil rights
restored. The simple fact that an offender carries a record serves to ‘emphasize [the
offender’s] “other-ness”’ within society.” (citing Margaret Colgate Love, Starting Over with
a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Section of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 1705, 1716 (2003))).
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assumptions about a person upon learning that they have a criminal record:
it is assumed that they are somehow less credible33 and less trustworthy.34
Further, important employment and housing decisions can be based solely
on ex-offender status.35
The conundrum herein is further complicated when knowledge of a
criminal conviction is obtained through the use of data brokers. First and
foremost, data brokers maintain proprietary databases and most are not
required to update their records.36 This Comment proposes that because of
this lack of regulation in updating their records, expunged convictions are
stored and released from these proprietary databases as if they had never
been expunged.37 Another problem with information from data brokers is
that, in creating consumer reports, data brokers often omit information and
reword or misinterpret language from the original court documents.38 The
resulting report might therefore contain a record of an arrest but no record
of the disposition—a serious problem if the charges were subsequently
dropped, for example.39 Or a report might mention the same offense twice,
when in reality, the individual was only convicted of the offense a single
time.40
The problem arises because assumptions are made about a person with
33
Even our judicial system allows for the introduction of a person’s prior criminal
conviction “[f]or the purpose of attacking the character for truthfulness” of that witness.
FED. R. EVID. 609.
34
Mouzon, supra note 19, at 2 (“The mere existence of a criminal history can produce
assumptions of past dishonesty and future untrustworthiness in the minds of all those aware
of that history.” (footnote omitted)). Cf. Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less:
Justifying Privacy Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 1056 (2003) (stating
that information about a person’s criminal past is highly relevant to determining a person’s
trustworthiness).
35
Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1332 (“A publicly available criminal record is
devastating to an individual’s hope of re-integrating into society, especially with respect to
employment and housing.”).
36
See infra Part III.
37
However, there is a lack of empirical data to support this proposition, so this Comment
also advocates the need for an empirical study. See supra text accompanying note 5.
38
For a thorough discussion of the potential problems with electronic databases, see
Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and Old-Fashioned
Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061, 1075–96 (2007); see also SEARCH REPORT, supra
note 10, at 11 (describing the process by which data brokers catalogue information in their
databases by converting information from many different sources into one standard format
that varies from data broker to data broker); see also Oyama, supra note 15, at 188–90
(noting that commercial criminal records databases are often “rife with error,” resulting in
inaccurate reports, and that reports can be difficult for lay users to interpret correctly).
39
Oyama, supra note 15, at 188–90.
40
Id.
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a criminal record, and once those assumptions are made they cannot be
undone. In other words, the social stigmatization of the criminal status is so
severe that subsequently learning a conviction was expunged usually does
nothing to change the opinions of those people who had previously found
out about the crime.41 This means that as soon as employers or landlords
discover that a person has a criminal record, the damage is likely
irreparable.
Social stigmatization as a result of having a criminal record is a root
cause for some of the collateral consequences associated with the
commission of a crime. In that way, expungement can be thought of as a
vehicle for alleviating at least some of those consequences.42 Black’s Law
Dictionary defines “collateral consequences” as “[a] penalty for committing
a crime, in addition to the penalties included in the criminal sentence.” 43
Employers and landlords frequently rely on criminal background checks to
vet applicants and often have policies in place that automatically disqualify
an applicant based on his or her status as a convicted criminal.44 Loss of
employment or housing is likely the most common, and arguably most
detrimental, collateral consequence ex-offenders face.45 For this reason, the
freedom from disclosing the existence of a criminal record, even when
asked directly on an application, is traditionally thought to be a benefit of
expungement. Take, for example, California’s expungement law, which
states:
In any case in which a defendant has fulfilled the conditions of probation for the entire
period of probation, or . . . in any other case in which a court, in its discretion and the
interests of justice, determines that a defendant should be granted the relief available
under this section . . . the court shall thereupon dismiss the accusations or information
against the defendant and except as noted below, he or she shall thereafter be released
from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense of which he or she has
46
been convicted . . . .

The phrase “released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from
41

Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1332.
For a discussion of the expansive collateral consequences associated with criminal
convictions, see Demleitner, supra note 32, passim.
43
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 298 (9th ed. 2009).
44
Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1340 (explaining that employers and landlords view
criminal records as somehow being indicative of a tendency in the individual to be unreliable
or dishonest and that such a presumption provides valid grounds for denying employment or
housing in many if not most jurisdictions).
45
Demleitner, supra note 32, at 156–57 (discussing the effects of ex-offender status on
access to employment); Oyama, supra note 15, at 181 (describing the devastating effect of
housing discrimination against those individuals with criminal records).
46
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.4(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2011) (emphasis added).
42
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the offense” 47 is said to provide the source for this right of nondisclosure in
California and has been interpreted by the California Court of Appeals to
mean that persons granted relief under this statute are released from “the
obligation to disclose the conviction in response to any direct question
contained in any questionnaire or application.”48
But wouldn’t it also follow that in order for an expungement to be
effective, information pertaining to the original conviction must be
similarly unavailable through means other than disclosure by the exoffender? As described below in Part III of this Comment, prior to the
digitization of information, simply granting this freedom not to disclose—
and serving the expungement order on the local or state agency maintaining
records—was all that was needed to prevent the information from being
unlawfully disclosed. However, in an internet era, simply granting
individuals the freedom not to disclose the existence of their criminal record
is no longer effective at preventing that information from being disclosed.
Expungement is a unique form of relief. It grants certain ex-offenders
a “clean slate,” essentially erasing the existence of a past offense.49 In fact,
in 1943, the Southern District of California, shortly after the passage of
California’s first expungement legislation, went so far as to equate
expungement with the grant of a pardon, stating that:
A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offence and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had
never committed the offence. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the
penalties and disabilities consequent upon conviction from attaching; if granted after
conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
50
capacity.

If the intended result of an expungement is to render the offender “as
innocent as if he had never committed the offence,” then, carrying the
reasoning of this court to its logical end, it is absolutely imperative that the
existence of the offense itself be kept a secret after expungement. 51 In sum,
expungement serves an important societal function in eliminating some of
47

Id.
People v. Mendez, 286 Cal. Rptr. 216, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
49
Black’s Law Dictionary defines “expungement of record” as follows: “The removal of
a conviction (esp. for a first offense) from a person’s criminal record.—Also termed
expunction of record; erasure of record.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 662 (9th ed. 2009).
50
In re Ringnalda, 48 F. Supp. 975, 977 (S.D. Cal. 1943) (quoting Ex parte Garland, 4
Wall. 333, 380–81 (1866)).
51
Diehm, supra note 18, at 76 (“The expungement of a criminal record will be of little
value if anyone acknowledges the record’s existence.”).
48
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the collateral consequences associated with conviction and allowing
individuals to reintegrate into society by obtaining employment and
housing. Therefore, in order for expungements to continue to provide relief
in an internet era, there must be a mechanism in place to ensure that postexpungement privacy violations do not occur.
III. THE DATA-BROKER INDUSTRY
The right to access public records, including court documents, is long
established in the United States.52 Accordingly, employers and landlords
have long been able to obtain the criminal records of potential employees
and tenants. However, it was not until after the advent of the internet in the
early 1990s that America experienced an explosion of the data-broker
industry.53 Prior to that time, obtaining information from public records
was very much a localized operation.54 Generally, the person, company, or
investigative agency for hire seeking information would obtain records on a
case-by-case basis directly from whatever state or local agency maintained
such records.55 Essentially, prior to the invention of the internet and the
creation of the private data-broker industry, the primary—if not singular—
way of obtaining information about an individual’s criminal record for the
purpose of employment or housing was by obtaining information directly
from a state agency.56
Now, however, we live in a different era. Consumer reports that
contain criminal history are now widely available through the use of thirdparty private background check companies and oftentimes directly over the

52

See Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978).
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 29. According to a report from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics, many scholars have also speculated that an increased demand for employee
and tenant background checks after the events of September 11th has contributed to large
industry growth. See id. at 31; James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expanding Scope, Use,
and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 204–05 (2007)
(noting an increase in fingerprinting and background checks post-September 11th); Liptak,
supra note 14 (“Since the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, criminal background checks have
become routine in many employment applications.”); Oyama, supra note 15, at 187 (“Post9/11 screening requirements have contributed to an ‘explosion’ in the demand for criminal
background checks in employment and tenant placement.”).
54
David S. Ardia, Reputations in a Networked World: Revisiting the Social Foundations
of Defamation Law, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 261, 310 (2010).
55
Id. It’s also worth noting that such records were usually maintained on paper and that
obtaining a “copy” of records at that time meant that the person would receive a paper
photocopy rather than digitized records, which are available now in many if not most
jurisdictions.
56
Id.
53
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internet.57 The process by which records are obtained and what types of
records are available varies somewhat based on individual state laws.58
However, modern data brokers, rather than obtaining information on a caseby-case basis, now purchase information in bulk from state and local
sources and store that information in their own databases.59 Over time these
databases have grown substantially and the data contained therein often
spans multiple jurisdictions and dates back many years.60
This Part will address two major issues that have contributed to the
evolution of the modern data-broker industry. First, the demand for
information at your fingertips has created strong industry incentives for data
brokers to acquire massive databases and to grow them constantly, rather
than update or eliminate old records. With the digitization of data and
certain state and local practices making the accumulation of data more
streamlined, these companies now have massive databases with information
about private citizens. The second issue is that without regulation requiring
these companies to update their records or punishing them for distributing
false data, there are no disincentives to balance out the perverse incentives
provided by the consumers. The result is a wildly unregulated behemoth of
an industry that is quietly posing a threat to the privacy rights of American
citizens.61
A. THE DATABASES: HOW INFORMATION IS COLLECTED, STORED,
AND DUPLICATED

The general process by which the biggest data brokers obtain records
is through what has been termed “bulk data purchases.”62 This entails the
bulk purchase of criminal records for multiple individuals all at one time
from state or local recordkeeping agencies and then storing that information
in proprietary databases “for instant searches.”63 Early in the development
of the data-broker industry, local agencies recognized the moneymaking
potential in selling public records to data brokers, and many of those local

57
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 7–9 (listing the key players in the data-broker
industry); BEST BACKGROUND CHECKS, http://www.bestbackgroundchecks.com (last visited
Nov. 11, 2011) (providing a directory of recommended data brokers in each state).
58
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 39–43; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1786–1786.2
(West 2009) (governing the process for obtaining and distributing public records in
California).
59
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 7–8, 10; Liptak, supra note 14.
60
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 7–8.
61
See infra Part III.B.
62
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, 10–12.
63
Id. at 10 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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agencies now garner a considerable profit from the practice.64
Notwithstanding limitations through some individual states’ laws and
practices,65 local agencies are essentially free to give over public records to
data brokers and turn a profit in the process.66
Furthermore, when the data-broker industry first blossomed, such
databases were usually limited to one jurisdiction or at least single states;
but over time data brokers began advertising national databases that would
“allow users to almost instantly search proprietary databases containing
upwards of 160 million criminal records from every State.”67 For example,
one data broker’s homepage boasts that “[w]ith one click [you can] search
over 300 million criminal records drawn from the archives of US courts and
correctional facilities.”68
Essentially, once a large market emerged for private background
checks,69 those companies providing the most information the fastest gained
a competitive advantage. In order to meet demand, these companies were
incentivized to grow their own databases by accumulating records in bulk
from state and local agencies rather than engaging in the time-consuming
process of requesting records on an individual, case-by-case basis.70
64
Oyama, supra note 15, 189 n.41 (“Some state and local governmental agencies have
discovered the profitability in offering [to sell criminal records] at a price. For example, the
Indianapolis Police Department makes criminal histories available at $15 per search on their
website, http://www.civicnet.net/allservices.html; the South Carolina Law Enforcement
Division charges $25 per name to perform a statewide criminal check on a name,
http://www.sled.sc.gov/CATCHHome.aspx?MenuID=CATCH.”).
65
Some states have passed laws that limit or prohibit the sale of certain records—
including criminal records—but these restrictions have actually had little effect on the databroker industry as a whole. For an explanation and overview of these state regulations, see
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 39–43. Some state agents simply refuse to engage in
the practice of selling records precisely because of the potential for subsequent violations of
post-expungement privacy. Liptak, supra note 14 (quoting a district clerk in Texas on the
subject: “How the hell do I expunge anything . . . if I sell tapes and disks all over the
country?”).
66
See SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 39–43 (providing an overview of state
statutes that regulate the sale and use of criminal records, but noting that very few are
tailored to regulate data brokers).
67
Id. at 11.
68
Criminal Records, INFOREGISTRY, http://www.inforegistry.com/index.php?page=
criminal_records (last visited Nov. 16, 2011).
69
After the events of September 11, 2001, there was a sudden and significant rise in the
demand for criminal background checks and consumer reporting services. See supra note
53.
70
The growth of national databases began around 2001, suggesting that the demand for
criminal records after September 11th created this industry incentive. See SEARCH
REPORT, supra note 10, at 11 (stating that data brokers began accumulating nationwide
databases in 2001); Oyama, supra note 15, at 187 (attributing the growth of the data-broker
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Naturally, these companies have to provide accurate information or
they would lose credibility with their customers. However, disclosing
information from expunged records would not necessarily diminish their
credibility, especially when considering data brokers’ clientele. One can
imagine that an employer or landlord who receives information from an
expunged record might not be dissatisfied with the background check
company at all; rather, the consumer would likely be pleased. Firstly, it is
important to note that information about an expunged conviction is not
factually incorrect.71 The individual was found guilty of a crime in the past
and granting an expungement does not make that fact any less true.
Furthermore, it is highly likely that employers and landlords would be
pleased to know that a potential employee or tenant once had a record, even
if he or she did not anymore.
As discussed in Part II of this Comment, the stigma of a criminal
record is incredibly strong. The suggestion being that the stigma associated
with criminal status is so strong and so negative that landlords and
employers will often deny housing and employment to individuals with
criminal records based only on the fact of their having a record.72 It is for
this reason that data brokers face no industry pressure to avoid releasing
information from expunged records. In fact, it is possible that because
employers and landlords might respond positively to the disclosure of
expunged records, data brokers actually have an incentive not to update
records or perform due diligence before releasing information.73 If state
and local recordkeeping agencies no longer have that information, data
brokers then become the only source from which employers and landlords
could obtain information from expunged records—information that the data
brokers’ clientele would likely value.
The fact remains that the story of our hypothetical young man is not
hyperbole.74 Where criminal records were once contained in file cabinets at
industry to increased demand for criminal records after September 11th).
71
For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A.
72
See supra notes 44–45 and accompanying text.
73
While there is no hard data to back up the argument that employers and landlords
would appreciate the disclosure of expunged records, it is certainly not an unwarranted
assumption based on the information cited in Part II of this Comment. Again, this is an area
where empirical research is important to supplement efforts to reform the data-broker
industry.
74
Even though extensive data quantifying the issue is unavailable, there is evidence that
background checks containing expunged records have had adverse consequences for
individuals in the job and housing market. See, e.g., Liptak, supra note 14 (discussing
several cases where people were denied employment and housing based on the disclosure of
their expunged records by background check companies). One man was denied employment
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local courthouses and halls of records, they are now mobile, capable of
rapid duplication, and readily accessible in electronic form.75 They are
being stored in massive, privately maintained databases and they are rarely,
if ever, updated.76 Finally, the combination of the industry’s incentive not
to update and increased access to information through the growth of the
industry creates an alarming likelihood that incorrect or harmful
information will come to light.77 Although it is unclear how frequently
outdated or expunged records are released, industry practice suggests it is
likely happening with alarming frequency.78
B. AN UNREGULATED INDUSTRY

Not only is there an industry incentive not to update records, but there
is also no counterweight to that incentive. As it stands, data brokers are not
required to exercise any due diligence with respect to the release of
based on the disclosure of his expunged record and is now suing both his potential employer
and the data broker that provided the information. An unidentified woman was unable to
purchase a condominium because her expunged conviction appeared on a background check.
And a third, unidentified man was unable to procure employment for six months due to an
expunged conviction appearing on his background check. Id.
75
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 10 (discussing the increasing digitization of court
records); Oyama, supra note 15, at 187 (“By 2003, 94% of the criminal history records
maintained by the state criminal history repositories were automated (71 million records).”).
76
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 11–12 (“Updates are typically available on a
monthly basis. This varies, however, depending not only upon how often the sources make
updates available, but also on whether the vendor promptly obtains the update and integrates
it into existing products. Updates may include only new records or they may also include
updated or deleted records. As a result, vendors customarily prefer to obtain an entirely new
copy of the database because this relieves the vendor of having to merge a small subset of
updates into an existing system . . . . [T]he commercial vendor must be proactive,
submitting orders and payments to the court or agency, which subsequently sends the data.”).
As noted above, there is no incentive for vendors to incur the extra cost or exert the extra
effort in obtaining updates in this way.
77
Once again, no empirical studies have been conducted to determine the number of
people who have been, or might be, adversely affected by the release of expunged records.
This is possibly due to the fact that employers and landlords do not always disclose their
reasons for denying employment and housing. See Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 53, at 212
(“Employers may actually disqualify job applicants based on a criminal record, but offer
other reasons or no reason at all for having rejected the ex-offender in favor of another job
applicant.”). Or perhaps it would be very difficult to determine how many criminal records
that have since been expunged are still being stored in private databases. Ultimately, such a
study would be an interesting, if not vital, follow-up to this argument.
78
As this Section argues, the industry provides disincentives for data brokers to be
proactive in seeking out updated records, and Part III.B of this Comment discusses the lack
of regulation that would compel them to do the same. The resulting combination of factors
strongly supports an inference that expunged records are stored in private databases and
released without consequence.
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expunged records.79 This Section addresses the current process for
removing information from propriety databases and how that process—
individual enforcement—is inadequate to protect post-expungement
privacy. Next, this Section discusses the Fair Credit Reporting Act
(FCRA), which is the only federal statute even tangentially related to data
brokers. However, this Section will show that the FCRA’s provisions were
not designed to regulate data brokers, making it an inefficient vehicle for
protecting post-expungement privacy. Finally, this Section concludes by
proposing a need for an independent statutory system specifically designed
to regulate the data-broker industry.
Currently, the only way to remove an expunged conviction from a data
broker’s records is to personally request that the information be removed.
This process is arduous and involves the submission of several documents
including court dispositions and expungement orders.80 In fact, some data
brokers even require that one submit along with this request a copy of the
information as it appears on the report from their websites.81 This
requirement is particularly troubling because it forces individuals to
purchase their own consumer reports before finding out whether any one
database contains an expunged conviction.
Even with a system that would easily allow an individual to remove
79

SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 11–12 (discussing the lack of regulation requiring
data brokers to update their records and noting that updates are scarcely available for even
those data brokers that might want to update their records).
80
See, e.g., Email from Lucy, Customer Serv. Representative, InfoRegistry.com, to
[name redacted] (Nov. 22, 2010) (on file with author) (responding to an inquiry into the
process for removing information from expunged records). This email responded as follows:
The best way to ensure that your information is removed properly is to contact us. As a courtesy,
you may opt-out of having certain of your information included in the Data that appears in search
results if one of these conditions exist: (1) You are a state, local or federal law enforcement
officer or public official and your position exposes you to a threat of death or serious bodily
harm; or (2) you are a victim of identity theft; or (3) you are at risk of physical harm; or (4) you
have evidence the record is incorrect or expunged. To opt-out, submit the following information:
1) A written explanation for the opt out request. Identify the specific location of Your Data on
our Website, and where your personal Data is publicly available, identify one of the four
conditions You [sic] enabling you to opt-out of having your personal Data removed, and describe
why such personal Data that is publicly available is inaccurate and harmful. NOTE: Please
submit ONE request per individual. 2) Copy of your current driver’s license or state
identification (this information is necessary in order for us to authenticate that the request is
being made by the individual to whom the information belongs to). All requests must include:
[f]ull name and date of birth, [a]liases, if any, [c]urrent address, [p]revious addresses, [p]hone,
[e]mail address. 3) Specific complete details of the records you are requesting to be removed.
NOTE: Only your current and up to two previous address records will be removed. 4) Include a
print out of the records you wish to have suppressed. 5) Copies of any applicable court orders, if
any.
81

Id.
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his or her own information, individual enforcement is still ineffective at
fixing the problem for more than just that one individual.82 As discussed
above, by the time that most individuals are made aware of the information
in these databases,83 the information has likely already been released and
the individuals have already suffered the negative consequences.
The only mechanism that currently regulates the activities of credit and
background check companies is the FCRA.84 However, there are several
issues that prevent the FCRA from being a successful tool in addressing the
specific issues associated with data brokers and post-expungement privacy.
Primarily, the FCRA does not impose any affirmative duties on data
brokers to update their records, and its enforcement provisions still put the
onus of ensuring compliance on individual persons. In sum, the FCRA is
impotent to address the problem at issue and may even help to contribute to
post-expungement privacy violations rather than curb them.85
When the FCRA was drafted in 1970, the internet as we have come to
know it had not yet been invented86 and any consumer information or public
records were still largely kept on paper. The result was a piece of
legislation that failed to comprehend the ease with which information
would one day be collected and widely disseminated.87 After all, how could
the members of Congress in 1970 anticipate the information age?
However, even with its current amendments, the FCRA still does not
82
Furthermore, even if a person succeeds at removing the information from one broker’s
proprietary database, the person would likely have to repeat the process for every other
broker that could potentially have purchased his records. Oftentimes, multiple data-broker
companies maintain separate databases. Thus, each individual with an expunged record
would have to contact each data broker and go through its arduous process to request that the
information be removed.
83
That is, if they are ever even made aware. See supra notes 43–44, 77 and
accompanying text.
84
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C § 1681 (2010). The FCRA applies, in
part, to any “consumer reporting agency that regularly engages in the practice of assembling
or evaluating, and maintaining, for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third
parties bearing on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, or credit capacity, . . .
[p]ublic record information.” Id. § 1681a(p).
85
For an enlightening discussion of the FCRA and its flaws, see De Armond, supra note
38, at 1098–1118.
86
See generally The Internet: A Short History of Getting Connected, FED. COMM.
COMMISSION, http://www.fcc.gov/omd/history/internet/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2011).
87
It also bears mentioning that many state expungement statutes were also drafted prior
to the information era and so likely also failed to anticipate the digitization of data. See, e.g.,
Act of July 15, 1935, ch. 604, § 5, 1935 Cal. Stats. 1709–10 (codified as amended at CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1203.4 (West 2008 & Supp. 2011)); Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, ch. 137,
§ 23, 1981 Wash. Sess. Laws 531 (codified as amended at WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 9.94A.640 (West 2010)); see generally Liptak, supra note 14.
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necessarily apply to all private data brokers selling criminal records to
private citizens.88 The FCRA was created with the aim of ensuring that
“consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the
needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other
information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with
regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of
such information.”89 In 1998, the Federal Trade Commission issued an
advisory letter confirming certain sections of the FCRA applied to agencies
that provide criminal records information for employment purposes.90 But
many data brokers still escape regulation and liability under the statute.91
This is likely because the general spirit of the FCRA—especially evident in
its citizen-suit provision92—is to protect consumers with respect to financial
and other consumer credit data, not with respect to criminal records.93 One
such provision that evinces the legislature’s intent to move away from
88

The FCRA defines a consumer reporting agency and what activities are covered under
its provisions. See supra note 95. However, these provisions are written is such a way that
data brokers are able to define themselves out of the FCRA’s grasp. See, e.g., Email from
Lucy, supra note 80 (“Please be aware that we are not a ‘consumer reporting agency’ as
defined by the FCRA, as we do not provide any data for use in credit, insurance, or
employment screening. We explicitly prohibit the use of our service and the data it supplies
for such purposes.”).
89
FCRA § 1681(b).
90
Advisory Letter from William Haynes, Division of Credit Practices, Fed. Trade
Comm’n, to Richard LeBlanc, Due Diligence, Inc. (June 9, 1998), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/leblanc.shtm (regarding Sections 603, 607, and 609 of the
Fair Credit Reporting Act).
91
See supra note 88.
92
It is worth noting that as of July 26, 2011, certain sections of the citizen-suit provision
of the FCRA were rescinded. Statement of General Policy or Interpretation; Commentary on
the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 76 Fed. Reg. 44462-01 (July 26, 2011) (rescinding 16 C.F.R.
§§ 600.1–.2). However, because these changes are so recent, it is unclear what their effect
will be on future litigation against data brokers under the FCRA. These changes may reflect
an effort to bring data brokers under the fold of the FCRA, but it is also possible that they
will push data brokers further out of the FCRA’s grasp as some past amendments have done.
See infra note 93. Regardless of the potential effect of these changes to the FCRA, the
purpose of this Section is to illustrate how the FCRA has not yet been successful at
regulating data brokers. Therefore, this Section includes cases and articles analyzing the
FCRA prior to the recent rescission.
93
The 2003 amendments removed a provision prohibiting the release of criminal
convictions dating back more than seven years, thus allowing credit reporting agencies to
hold on to criminal records indefinitely. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003
(FACTA), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952 (2003); see also Geffen & Letze, supra note
27, at 1339. While it is possible that this provision was removed in order to preserve the
statute’s purpose as being confined to consumer-credit agencies, it is certainly true that by
removing protections on criminal records, the FCRA became less effective at regulating the
data-broker industry.
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regulating data brokers is the fact that the FCRA allows criminal
convictions to be reported indefinitely.94 This provision encourages the
disclosure of expunged records rather than serving to regulate the practice.
Furthermore, even if the FCRA applied to all data brokers, the only
restriction that it would place on them is the requirement that they “follow
reasonable procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy.”95 This
vague and ambiguous standard hardly imposes an affirmative duty upon
data brokers to update their records. In fact, courts have interpreted this
accuracy provision as requiring data brokers only to “weigh the potential
that the information will create a misleading impression against the
availability of more accurate [or complete] information and the burden of
providing such information.”96 Essentially, the FCRA allows data brokers
to pass on unvetted information without suffering any consequences, even if
the information turns out to be incorrect.97
This leads to the second reason why the FCRA does not adequately
regulate problems specifically associated with post-expungement privacy.
Not only does the FCRA fail at imposing affirmative duties on data brokers,
its enforcement provisions are both textually and practically insufficient to
provide consumers with a remedy after their post-expungement rights have
been violated.98 The FCRA contains a citizen-suit provision that allows
civil causes of action for both willful and negligent noncompliance with the
FCRA provisions.99 However, as discussed above, courts have interpreted
the responsibilities of data brokers under the FCRA’s accuracy provisions
to be so minimal that plaintiffs rarely prevail in such suits.100 The result is a
statutory scheme that fails to regulate the release of harmful, false
information and then fails to provide an adequate remedy for those who are
directly harmed when the information is released.

94

See Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1339.
FCRA § 1681e(b); see also Haynes, supra note 90.
96
See, e.g., Koropoulos v. Credit Bureau, Inc., 734 F.2d 37, 42 (7th Cir. 1984).
97
De Armond, supra note 85, at 1102–03; see, e.g., Smith v. Auto Mashers, Inc., 85 F.
Supp. 2d 638, 641 (W.D. Va. 2000) (dismissing a complaint against a data broker on the
grounds that “simply by reporting an item of information that turns out to be inaccurate” is
not a violation of the FCRA).
98
Notwithstanding the fact that ex post remedies fail to prevent or remedy harms
associated with post-expungement privacy, this Section will discuss the inadequacies of the
FCRA in providing any sort of remedy for those individuals whose post-expungement rights
have been violated. See infra Parts IV–V for a discussion dismissing ex post remedies in the
post-expungement privacy context.
99
FCRA § 1681n (imposing civil liability for willful noncompliance), id. § 1681o (civil
liability for negligent noncompliance).
100
De Armond, supra note 38, at 1103–04.
95
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The FCRA is the only statute that currently governs the data-broker
industry, and it is woefully inadequate to address the issues of postexpungement privacy. Therefore, a comprehensive legislative mechanism
specifically designed to regulate the data-broker industry is needed to
protect post-expungement privacy rights.
IV. SUPPORT FOR A FEDERAL STATUTE
This Part will argue that a federal statute is the only remedy likely to
have a significant effect on the violation of post-expungement privacy
rights. This Part first explores and dismisses individual, private common
law causes of action as one possible remedy.101 Next, this Part addresses
the possibility of state regulation, but ultimately dismisses this as
ineffective due to the national reach of the data-broker industry. Finally,
this Part discusses the authority under which a federal statute can be
devised and will make arguments for such a statute’s comparative
superiority to the other two remedies aforementioned.
A. WHY PRIVATE CIVIL CAUSES OF ACTION ARE INADEQUATE

An individual private right of action is one possible way to enforce
post-expungement privacy laws. One type of private civil action—action
under the FCRA—has already been discussed and dismissed as an
inadequate remedy in Part III of this Comment. However, there are other
civil actions that would provide possible methods for enforcing postexpungement privacy rights. This Comment ultimately argues that such
individual remedies without the support of a larger government regulatory
scheme would be inadequate to address the scope of this issue. The
overarching and most salient reason is that there is essentially no way to
provide any ex post remedy when post-expungement privacy rights have
been violated; no one can un-ring the bell. However, there are also
problems with individual civil remedies—such as the tort of defamation—
in that those traditional causes of action would not support claims for
violations of post-expungement privacy even if such claims would be
valuable to potential plaintiffs.
In January 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided G.D. v.
Kenny.102 This case involves a defamation103 suit based on the disclosure of
101

This Comment uses the example of defamation suits in representing all private
common law causes of action.
102
15 A.3d 300 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2011).
103
In New Jersey, defamation is a tort that is defined as follows: “In order to prove
defamation, a plaintiff must establish, in addition to damages, that the defendant (1) made a
defamatory statement of fact (2) concerning the plaintiff (3) which was false, and (4) which
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information from expunged criminal records. The facts of the G.D. case
were as follows: the plaintiff, a former aide to a political candidate in New
Jersey, brought a defamation claim against members of an opposing
candidate’s staff who had circulated political smear fliers referring to the
plaintiff’s drug-related convictions, which had previously been expunged.104
The plaintiff claimed that the fliers constituted defamation (as well as
several other torts) and the defendant claimed truth as a defense.105 The
New Jersey Supreme Court ultimately decided for the defendant on three
separate grounds: first, that the defendants were entitled to a truth
defense;106 second, that the fliers were substantially true;107 and third, that
the plaintiff did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy just because
his convictions were expunged.108
This case is particularly pertinent for several reasons. The court’s
three holdings highlight two different problems with defamation suits for
post-expungement privacy violations. First, the problem of truth:109 in
allowing defamation suits for the disclosure of expunged convictions,
courts would be creating a legal fiction whereby the fact of a conviction
somehow becomes “untrue” once it has been expunged. One could argue—
as G.D. did110—that the statements have a defamatory nature because the

was communicated to a person or persons other than the plaintiff.” Feggans v. Billington,
677 A.2d 771, 775 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (citing Bainhauer v. Manoukian, 520
A.2d 1154 (N.J. App. Div. 1987)).
104
G.D., 15 A.3d at 306. The flier, including a picture of the plaintiff, read:
TEAM STACK: COKE DEALERS. GUN RUNNERS. EX-CONS[.] THE MORE PEOPLE KNOW, THE
MORE QUESTIONS THEY HAVE ABOUT BRIAN STACK. UNION CITY MAYOR BRIAN STACK’S
CLOSEST POLITICAL OPERATIVES: GUN RUNNERS, COKE DEALERS, EX-CONS.

We all know
the threat that drugs and illegal guns have in our communities. But not Brian Stack.
He continues to surround himself with one shady character after another—not one but
two convicted drug dealers and ex-cons, whom Stack got a high paying county job
and a drugged out gun running lowlife who was his campaign manager. BRIAN STACK
PREACHES “REFORM” AND “GOOD GOVERNMENT” BUT HIS ADMINISTRATION IS MADE UP
OF SLEAZY DRUG DEALERS AND OTHERS WHO SHOULD BE NOWHERE NEAR THE PUBLIC
TREASURY.

Id. (line breaks omitted).
105
Id. at 304.
106
Id.
107
Id. (“Although our expungement statute relieves a prior offender of some civil
disabilities, it does not extinguish the truth.”).
108
Id.
109
This problem encompasses the court’s first two holdings that the defendants are
entitled to a truth defense and that the fliers were substantially true.
110
G.D., 15 A.3d at 307–09.
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expungement itself renders them essentially untrue.111 However, the fact
remains that the conviction did occur and just because it was expunged does
not make it untrue.112 As the New Jersey Supreme Court noted, truth is not
just a common law defense to defamation but it is also protected by the
First Amendment.113 From the perspective of a defendant in a defamation
suit for post-expungement privacy violations, a finding of liability would
erode those First Amendment rights. And for what? The most any plaintiff
can hope for is monetary damages because the harm caused by the release
of information cannot be undone.
To further prove the point, consider a situation where the alleged
defamer also discloses that the record was expunged. This statement would
still harm the defendant in the same way—because it discloses the existence
of their criminal record—but, in this instance, it is a completely true
statement because the defamer also discloses that the record was expunged.
The fact remains that the release of expunged records can cause the same
type of harm that ordinary defamatory statements can. However, the fact of
expungement does not render those statements untrue, and thus postexpungement privacy claims do not fit squarely into the tort of
defamation.114
The final part of the G.D. court’s holding, that G.D. did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, highlights another complication with
civil suits as a remedy for post-expungement privacy violations—the fact
that convictions are made public. The New Jersey Supreme Court noted
that arrests, indictments, and convictions are a matter of public record,115
and as a result newspapers, magazines, court reporters, individuals, and

111
As discussed in Part II of this Comment, expungements grant citizens the right to
proceed as if they were never convicted of a crime and to be free of the “criminal”
designation. Following that logic, one could argue that disclosing the fact of an expunged
criminal conviction is untrue because that person is no longer a “criminal.” This is the spirit
of what G.D. attempts to argue. Id. at 307–09.
112
The New Jersey Supreme Court belabors this point several times throughout its
opinion. See, e.g., id. at 304, 310, 313.
113
Id. at 310 (“The law of defamation attempts to strike the proper balance between
protecting reputation and protecting free speech.” (quoting Ward v. Zelikovsky, 643 A.2d
972, 978 (N.J. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114
It is possible that courts in other jurisdictions may decide this issue differently than
the court in G.D. did. However, even if post-expungement privacy violations could form the
basis of a defamation (or other tort) suit, such suits would still be ineffective at addressing
the root of the problem: that expungement itself is ineffective unless post-expungement
privacy violations can be prevented. And post-expungement privacy violations can never be
prevented with ex post remedies, like those available in civil suits.
115
G.D., 15 A.3d at 309.
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even data brokers lawfully obtain that information.116 It is true that when a
conviction is expunged, the information is no longer available to the general
public through official channels, but it is still legally available from any of
those other sources.117 The G.D. court deftly observes that “[a]ll of the
beneficial purposes of the expungement statute, and the protections it
provides, will not allow a person to fully escape from his past.”118 In other
words, because information from expunged records is readily available, and
it is currently legal for non-government sources to maintain and provide
that information, the current common law system will never support
individual civil actions for post-expungement privacy violations.
In conclusion, post-expungement privacy violations are uniquely
unsuited for civil tort suits, both because the information from those records
is not untrue and because civil suits would have little effect on the
overarching problem of post-expungement privacy violations. Without
being incorporated into a larger statutory scheme, such suits merely place
small bandages on a gaping wound. As the New Jersey Supreme Court
made clear in its observations, the data-broker industry has already grown
to epic proportions and is proceeding unregulated, so the problem is far too
big to resolve without going to the source and regulating the companies
themselves.
B. WHY STATE STATUTES ARE INADEQUATE

State regulations are another possible solution to regulate violations of
post-expungement privacy by data brokers. In an ideal world, if every state
simultaneously enacted legislation, this could be a potential solution; but
because data brokers maintain and distribute records throughout the nation,
this solution is inadequate.
Some states have already recognized this problem and attempted to
address it through regulation of employers and landlords rather than data
brokers.119 Some state regulations, along with some helpful federal
provisions of Title VII,120 prohibit the use of expunged criminal records to
discriminate against applicants when making employment and housing
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Id. at 312–13.
Id. at 313.
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Id.
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SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 61–65 (describing the various state laws that
govern the use of criminal convictions and arrests in making housing and employment
decisions).
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Id. (comparing Title VII’s provisions governing the use of criminal records to those of
individual state statutes, the states’ statutes being more robust).
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decisions.121
Other state statutes regulate the dissemination of
122
information.
Currently, the only type of state law that directly regulates
data brokers is laws controlling the dissemination of government
information to data brokers.
However, even if individual states
aggressively regulated the dissemination of data, at this point in time, it is
too little too late.123 Since data brokers have already amassed significant
databases over time, they currently possess millions of records, some of
which have either already been expunged or might be expunged in the
future. Thus, stopping the flow of records to these databases now would do
nothing to prevent the release of records that they already have.
Because employers and landlords are more easily reached through
state police powers than are national data brokers, the current state
regulations make sense from the states’ perspective. However, such
regulation is ineffective for two main reasons. First, in the contexts of atwill employment and housing, employers and landlords have nearly free
rein to choose one applicant over another. Thus, a law prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of an expunged record would just encourage
these employers to find a pretextual reason to discriminate against exoffender applicants. After all, “when choosing between an ex-con and a
person without a criminal past, most employers are likely to choose the
latter.”124 Second, these regulations do not address the ultimate issue—they
do not prevent data brokers from releasing expunged records. It is this
preventative goal that is most important and needs to be addressed if there
is any hope of protecting post-expungement privacy.
An important consideration in dismissing state regulation and
proposing a federal statutory scheme is whether such a scheme might
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See id.; Geffen & Letze, supra note 27, at 1348 n.86 and accompanying text.
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 26–27 (“State law largely regulates noncriminal
justice access to information in the State repositories. Repositories in 43 states and
territories responded to a March 2001 SEARCH email survey regarding the extent to which
they disclose criminal history information to the public (that is, to noncriminal justice users
such as employers and vendors). More than two-thirds of the responding repositories
reported disclosing at least some criminal history information to the public. Information
disclosed by the State repositories varies widely, depending upon State law. Some States
disclose everything on file, with the exception of sealed or expunged records, while others
disclose only adult offender conviction data that is less than 10 years old. Some States
require the submission of the subject’s fingerprints as a prerequisite for disclosure, while
others make information available on the basis of name-plus-identifier checks.” (footnote
omitted)).
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However, the federal statute that this Comment proposes should contain provisions
regulating the dissemination of information.
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Hacker, supra note 32, at 471 (footnote omitted).
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infringe on state sovereignty.125 Any time a federal regulatory scheme is
proposed in an area that is traditionally reserved for the states, federalism
concerns are inevitably going to surface. However, in this circumstance,
even though regulating expungement and the maintenance of criminal
records is typically reserved to the states, there is a strong argument to be
made that regulating the data-broker industry is a separate issue capable of
federal regulation under Commerce Clause authority.126
C. WHY A FEDERAL STATUTE IS SUPERIOR

First, Congress has the power to regulate both the channels of
commerce and all things that are in, of, or about interstate commerce.127
There is no doubt that the sale and purchase of criminal records across state
lines is a part of interstate commerce. Similarly, the data brokers
themselves are, in a sense, vehicles for interstate commerce. Finally, and in
a much more tangential sense, the fact that the sale and purchase of records
for the purpose of employment and housing has an effect on the job and
housing markets could be found under the aggregating effects test128 to also
give Congress the authority to regulate in this area. Furthermore, the
FCRA—at least with respect to sovereignty concerns—is already regulating
a very similar market and paves the way for the type of regulation that this
Comment proposes.129 In sum, it is clear that Congress has the power to
regulate the data-broker industry through the Commerce Clause.
With that in mind, a federal regulatory scheme is the best solution for
125

The following is only a brief discussion of federalism concerns as they apply to the
creation of a federal statute, and this Comment does not purport to present a full analysis of
the issue.
126
See infra Part IV.C.
127
Original authority for commerce power is derived from Article I, Section Eight,
Clause Three of the United States Constitution, which provides inter alia that Congress shall
have the power to “regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. However, that power has been interpreted by the judiciary to
include the power to regulate the channels of interstate commerce, all things that fall within
interstate commerce, and those things that substantially affect interstate commerce. See, e.g.,
Nat’l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1938); Champion v.
Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903) (in, of, and about interstate commerce); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. 1 (1824) (channels of interstate commerce). For a discussion of the history and
evolution of Congress’s commerce power, see Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 MICH. L.
REV. 1 (2010).
128
See Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 301 U.S. 1 (first iterations of aggregation); Gonzales
v. Raich, 541 U.S. 1 (2005) (modern aggregation).
129
In fact, it has been proposed by some that effective regulation of the data-broker
industry could even be accomplished through amendments to the FCRA itself. See
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 71–72 (analyzing whether the FCRA should be
amended to reach data brokers).
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protecting post-expungement privacy rights. Such a scheme is preferable to
individual private rights of action.130 This is because citizen suits fail to
effectively address large-scale post-expungement privacy violations.
Furthermore, an ex post remedy fails to regulate the data-broker industry as
a whole and thus does nothing to prevent violations from occurring in the
first place. Although state statutes have some potential to regulate data
brokers, on a larger level they will remain ineffective because these
companies operate nationally and state laws cannot get to the “heart of the
monster,” so to speak. However, a federal statutory scheme should still
pave the way for individual state regulation to come in and fill in the pieces,
for example with regulations that limit the dissemination of information in
the future.
In sum, federal legislation is the most effective way to address postexpungement privacy because the problem is simply too large. Data
brokers’ proprietary databases now span multiple jurisdictions and date
back many years.131 The data-broker industry has already been allowed to
go on too long threatening the privacy rights of American citizens.
Accordingly, the only effective way to curb continuing violations is through
regulation that would apply universally to all data brokers and to all of the
information in their databases.
V. PROPOSED AIMS FOR FEDERAL REGULATION
The final Part of this Comment provides proposed aims and suggested
provisions for a federal statute designed to protect post-expungement rights.
This Part considers first provisions designed to place an affirmative duty on
data brokers themselves, then provisions designed to regulate state and local
agencies, and finally provisions relating to enforcement.
A. AFFIRMATIVE DUTIES FOR DATA BROKERS

The first provision of the statute must define which companies fall
within the regulatory scheme. The statute must cover any company that
profits from the sale of information from public records, including arrests
and convictions. The danger with respect to defining the scope of the
statute is to ensure that all data brokers, as discussed and defined herein, are
subject to restriction, without including media sources or other private
sources of information.132
130

However, a citizen-suit provision should still be included within the federal regulatory
scheme. See infra Part V.
131
See supra Part II.
132
Specifically, the statute must be careful not to implicate newspaper archives or other
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Once the statute defines which agencies are subject to its provisions,
the statute must also clearly state that it is limited to expungement of
misdemeanors and arrests that do not result in conviction.133 The reasons
are similar to this Comment’s purpose in excluding them from its
discussion: that policy debates and variations in state laws with respect to
felony, juvenile, and sex-related convictions would complicate federal
regulation. Also, because of these variations between state laws, it might be
inappropriate for federal regulation to step in where some states may have
chosen not to regulate. Finally, once the statute has limited the scope of its
application, it must include provisions that impose affirmative duties
directly on data brokers.
1. Prohibition on Willful or Negligent Disclosure
One provision of the statute must place an affirmative duty on data
brokers to refrain from either willfully or negligently disclosing incorrect
information, including the disclosure of convictions that have been
expunged. However, the standard for negligent disclosure must be much
more stringent than those found in the FCRA. Under the FCRA, companies
distributing information must only “maintain ‘reasonable’ procedures to
assure maximum possible accuracy.”134 As discussed in Part III.B, this
places an extremely light burden on credit-reporting agencies.135 The
burden is so light that they are rarely, if ever, found liable for violations of
the aforementioned provision.136 The provision proposed here should
require that data brokers exercise reasonable care in ensuring that the
information they are distributing is correct. The reasonable care standard
would be met by performing the regular updates in accordance with Part
V.A.2 below. Furthermore, should incorrect information or information
from expunged records be released due to a failure in updating, a company
would be considered negligent per se and subject to sanctions as per Part
V.C below.

websites and publications that, while they may profit from the release of information
pertaining to criminal records—by the sale of their papers—are not agencies that
intentionally maintain and distribute criminal records themselves for profit. Essentially, this
statute should be limited so as not to require those media sources that report on public trials
to be held liable for making archives of their past editions available to the public.
133
See supra Part II.
134
FCRA, 15 U.S.C § 1681e(b) (2010).
135
See supra Part III.B.
136
See supra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
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2. Regular Updates
Next, there must be a provision requiring that brokers regularly update
their records. How often these companies should be required to update
their records would have to depend on a survey of state and local recordkeeping agencies to ascertain how frequently updates can be made
available. However, once every six to eight months would be ideal, as
expungements are granted regularly.
3. Disposing of Records
The next provision should require that data brokers dispose of records
of criminal convictions and arrests after a certain number of years have
elapsed, perhaps borrowing the seven-year time period that was once
included in the FCRA. The policy justification is to curb the proprietary
databases and to provide an additional incentive for data brokers to seek out
updates. One suggestion would be to perform a multi-state survey of the
average number of years that it takes to expunge different offenses and then
limit data brokers accordingly. Regardless, this provision should also be
retroactive in that it applies to all records that, at the time the statute is
passed, date back longer than the statutorily prescribed maximum period.
This retroactivity provision would be incredibly useful in purging the
already existing databases that pose a potential threat to post-expungement
privacy in the future.
4. Standardization of Reporting
The statute must also set guidelines for the standardization of reporting
information from criminal records. Because of variations in the way
different jurisdictions report and maintain their records and differences in
local laws, data brokers often “normalize” information using their own
internal system.137 This can result in misinterpretation and subsequent
misinformation when the final consumer report is produced.138 Such
practices can have harmful effects even for those individuals whose
criminal records have not been expunged. For example, a consumer report
could say nothing more than “drug-related conviction,” which could refer to
a large range of possible charges from possession to sale and including
everything in between. Such potential for confusion and misinformation in
the current system must be remedied. Again, the best system for
normalizing these reports should be developed through comparison of
current state and local reporting systems. But with the limited scope of this
137
138

See supra Part III.
See id.
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statute, it should not be too difficult to normalize reporting.
B. REGULATING STATE AND LOCAL AGENCIES

It is also vital that any proposed statutory scheme put some limitations
on the dissemination of data by state and local agencies. While such a
provision might pose some federalism issues, in order to curb the privacy
violations caused by the data-broker industry, it is important that data
brokers no longer have the unfettered access to criminal records that they
have now.
In order to require that data brokers regularly update their records, any
state agency providing criminal records should have a concurrent duty to
regularly update records and provide such updates to data brokers. While
directly regulating the practices of state agencies would likely be outside of
the Commerce Clause authority,139 Congress could attach the requirement
of regular updating as a condition on selling records in interstate commerce.
Provided that Congress could attach such a condition, possible ways in
which updates would be available should be determined by, again,
surveying state and local practices to determine the best possible procedure.
One suggestion would be for state and local agencies to send updates along
with invoices as a condition upon the sale of records to data brokers—
which some states are already in the practice of doing.140
C. ENFORCEMENT

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this Comment proposes a set of
comprehensive enforcement provisions that put the onus of responsibility
on the data brokers. These enforcement provisions are necessary to create
the most effective statute possible.
1. Monetary Sanctions
The statute must include a provision providing monetary sanctions that
attach to any data broker who violates any provision of the statute. For
example, any data broker that releases inaccurate information, including
information about an expunged conviction, will face a fine. The amount
should be appropriate to sufficiently deter data brokers from the practice

139

Such regulation would also implicate concerns associated with compelling states to
take certain actions under Commerce Clause power. See New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the so-called take-title provision of a federal statute was
unconstitutional essentially because it amounted to Congress compelling a state to comply
with federal regulations).
140
SEARCH REPORT, supra note 10, at 11.
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and incentivize due diligence. Furthermore, liability under this section
should be on a strict liability basis as opposed to by the level of culpability
of the data broker. The reason for a strict liability standard with respect to
monetary sanction is so that whatever administrative agency—likely the
FTC—is in charge of enforcement will not have to hold hearings to
determine culpability each time a data broker releases incorrect information.
Naturally, the dollar amount per infraction would be adjusted down to
account for a strict liability standard. Lastly, monetary sanctions should
also attach, and at a higher amount, for failure to update regularly as per the
updating procedures recommended herein.
2. Civil Sanctions
The statute should also provide civil sanctions for violation of its
provisions. One possibility might be revoking or suspending the business
licenses of those companies that fail to comply with the statutory
provisions. Another might be something like an audit, where companies
consistently in violation would be subject to more stringent review.
Regardless of what particular sanctions should be in place, having civil
sanctions on top of monetary penalties would necessarily strengthen the
enforceability of the statute.
3. Citizen Suits
Lastly, it is imperative that the statute contains a citizen suit provision
that both provides a means for reporting violations of the statute to the
appropriate administrative agency and allows for private rights of action for
harm caused by such violations. Citizens whose rights have been violated
are without a doubt the most effective policing tools in this type of statutory
scheme, and so the statute must provide a venue for such citizens to report
violations to the appropriate administrative body. The statute should also
provide for injunctive relief to prevent the release of incorrect information
before that information causes harm. This provision would also require that
data brokers honor expungement orders, and this portion of the statute
should outline standardized procedures for private citizens to request their
information be removed from proprietary databases. Finally, citizens who
have been harmed by the release of incorrect information should have a
clear cause of action for compensatory and punitive damages in civil court.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Comment has identified a largely unregulated industry that poses
a threat to the privacy rights of individual citizens. Accordingly, the goal of
this Comment is twofold: first, to clearly identify the issue and pave the
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way for the kind of empirical study that is needed to move this issue into
Congress’s cognizance; and second, to propose a solution that would help
protect individuals with expunged records.
We know that data brokers have amassed significant databases of
criminal records, spanning many years and across many jurisdictions. We
know that they are not currently required to update their records and—at
least with respect to records that have been expunged—are incentivized not
to seek out updates from state agencies. We know that expungements are
granted every year in all of the states that have expungement statutes. We
know that the release of expunged records has had a negative effect on at
least some American citizens. We cannot ignore the possibility that data
brokers are posing a significant threat to post-expungement privacy. The
problem of unauthorized or unlawful release of expunged criminal records
by data brokers can be devastating to the lives of people with expunged
records. Something must be done to protect against it. The federal
statutory scheme that this Comment proposes would be the first step in the
right direction towards curbing the negative fallout from the data-broker
industry.

